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BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Industrial
Commission in this workers' compensation proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 35-1-86 (1988).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the Industrial Commission commit error and abuse its discretion by not
referring this case back to the medical panel for consideration of the new material
medical evidence obtained and submitted by the Appellant after the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order were issued by the Administrative Law Judge? The
standard for review is abuse of discretion, King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2D
1281 (Ut.App. 1993) and Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i), U.C.A. (1987).
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2. Did the Industrial Commission misapply the holding of Stokes v. Board of
Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Ut. App. 1992) in denying medical treatment and compensation
for psychiatric problems that the medical panel concluded that the Appellant suffers
from as a result of her industrial incident by its conclusion that she had an abnormal
reaction to a normal event? The standard for review is substantial evidence, Smallwood
v. Industrial Commission. 8451 P.2d 716 (Ut. App. 1992) and 63-46b-16(4)(g), U.C.A.
(1987).
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Appellant submits that the following statute may be determinative of the central
issue in this proceeding:
Section 35-1-78(1), U.C.A. (1994):
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall
be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time
to time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records
pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other
than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been
filed as in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the
commission.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a) Nature of the Proceedings
This appeal involves a full denial of benefits in a workers1 compensation claim
and is from a final Order of the Industrial Commission affirming the Administrative
Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and denying the
Appellant's Motion for Review and Motion for Reconsideration.
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(b) Course of Proceedings
1.

On June 9, 1992, Mrs. Giles filed an Application for Hearing with the

Industrial Commission seeking workers' compensation benefits for an industrial injury
sustained in September of 1991 while employed by the Oakridge Country Club. R5.
The Respondents Oakridge Country Club and/or the Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah denied that the applicant had sustained a compensable industrial injury and that
the incident occurred as she described. R8,9.
2.

On January 4, 1993, a hearing was held before the Honorable Timothy

C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. R228-365. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued
preliminary Findings of Fact and referred the case to a medical panel. R17-25 The
medical panel met with the applicant in February of 1993 and issued a report which was
circulated to the parties in April of 1993. R26-42. On July 15, 1993, the ALJ issued his
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order wherein he fully denied Mrs. Giles'
claim for benefits.R104-117.
3.

Mrs. Giles thereafter retained new counsel who filed a Motion for

Review on Monday, August 16, 1993. R118-121and R619-622 and R674-681. Among
other things, in the motion, Mrs. Giles stated that she had seen a new doctor on July
14, 1993 and would soon be undergoing new tests at the University of California,
Irvine. These tests would include a PET scan, which was not available in Utah at that
time. In the Motion, it was requested that the Industrial Commission take no further
action on the case until the test results were released and could be submitted. R118-121.
4.

On December 14, 1993 Mrs. Giles filed a Supplement to the Applicant's

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Review.

This supplement contained the

reports and test results generated as a result of Mrs. Giles' testing at the University of
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California, Irvine.

It was submitted as new and previously unavailable evidence

showing that the Applicant sustained brain damage as a result of the chlorine gas
episode at the Oak Ridge Country Club in September of 1991. R127-150.
5.

The Industrial Commission issued its Order Denying Motion for Review

on June 6, 1994. R165-167. On Monday June 27, 1994, the Applicant submitted a
Request for Reconsideration. Included in this pleading were new reports from a
neurotoxicologist/ immunotoxicologist from California who wrote a report on June
21, 1994 relative to further examination and testing of Mrs. Giles in 1994. R154-164. It
was submitted as further support for the new evidence submitted in the December 14,
1993 Supplement mentioned above.
6

An Order denying the Request for Reconsideration was issued by the

Indust-rial Commission on July 14, 1994. R171-172.
7.

The Petition for Writ of Review was filed with this Court on August 12,

1994. On September 9, 1994, this Court issued a Sue Sponte Motion for Summary
Disposition. The parties responded to the motion within the time allowed and the
Motion was denied by this Court on October 26, 1994.
(c) Statement of Relevant Facts.
1.

Glenda Giles was an employee of the Oakridge Country Club as of

September 7, 1991. She was hired on June 3, 1991 to work as office manager for the
organization. R235.
2.

On the morning of September 7, 1991, there was a brief power outage at

the country club. Later that morning, Mrs. Giles directed a co-employee, Paul Spencer,
to deliver some materials to the basement of the building. R279. Mr. Spencer shortly
returned and reported that there was a chlorine gas leak in the basement where the
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swimming pool machinery and supplies were kept. R280. Mr. Spencer and another
employee then went to attempt to turn off the chlorine. R281. After they left, as she
believed, for the basement, Mrs. Giles spoke with the pool manager who advised her to
get some fans to air out the basement. She then spoke with a construction worker, who
was there as part of a remodeling crew, about getting some fans. He advised her to call
the fire department and have an oxygen breathing mask brought as "you don't mess
with chlorine gas." R281,282.
3.

Mrs. Giles became concerned when the two co-employees didn't return

and so she determined to go down to the basement to look for them. She told a
secretary to call the paramedics if she wasn't back in five minutes. She then went into
the basement and called several times for the two men in the dimly lit basement. She
testified that by then she was having trouble breathing; her nose was running, her eyes
were running, she had a headache and she felt dizzy. She then took a deep breath and
screamed the names of the two men. She heard one answer and then learned that they
were not in the basement, but were outside in the parking lot. She later learned that
the turnoff valve for the chlorine bottle was outside of the building. R282,283.
4.

Later, men from the fire department arrived and some employees were

evacuated from the building. Mrs. Giles testified that she was feeling nauseated at that
time and two firemen had her lie down. She was later taken to Humana Health Davis
North for medical treatment. She received medical care from various providers after
that.

She had a variety of physical and mental complaints including dizziness,

headaches, anxiety attacks, difficulty with memory, decreased concentration, stuttering
and stammering, blurred vision, and sensitivity to some fumes. R283,285.
5.

Following

the

evidentiary

hearing
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held

before

the

Industrial

Commission, the Administrative Law Judge issued preliminary Findings of Fact (R1725) wherein he concluded that Mrs. Giles wasn't exposed to chlorine gas per se, but
rather that she was exposed to the smell of what he termed "superchlorinated water."
This was based on his finding that the hose to the chlorine tank didn't rupture, but
rather the rupture concerned a line containing water that has been mixed with chlorine
gas that would be pumped into the swimming pool. These preliminary Findings of
Fact were sent to the medical panel appointed by the Judge, along with the medical
records. The panel was commissioned to determine if Mrs. Giles' health problems were
medically related to the September 7, 1991 industrial accident. R17-25.
6.

The February, 1993 report of the medical panel concluded that none of

the Appellant's complaints were directly related to the industrial accident. R26-46.
They found no evidence in the medical records, and from blood gas studies, that she has
damage from the exposure to the fumes from the superchlorinated water. The panel did
feel that because of the Appellant's fear that she had been exposed to chlorine gas, and
because of the behavior of emergency personnel at the scene, and because she was given
the impression that something was wrong with her blood gases, she had a psychiatric
injury. The panel concluded that the events of the episode created a "mental stress
arising out of her employment and was beyond that ordinarily encountered by people
in life and employment in general." R40. Her past history, which was positive for some
psychiatric problems and somatic complaints, made her vulnerable to the events of the
episode on September 7, 1991. R41. As a result, the panel suggested that Mrs. Giles be
given psychiatric counseling for up to six months. R41.
7.

Mrs. Giles was seen by Dr. Richard A. Nelson, M.D. of Billings,

Montana on July 14, 1993 for further study of her complaints. R619-622. He felt she
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might have a low level organic mental syndrome due to possible chlorine gas exposure.
He recommended additional tests that she had not had before. These included a socalled P-300 and Neurometries EEG. In that report he stated that if the results of those
tests proved to be abnormal, he might refer her for a PET (positron emission
tomography, R-130) scan "to see if a follow up would show alterations in the sites that
one would expect to see with any anoxic episodes associated with acute pulmonary
embarrassment during the time of her exposure to the chlorine gas." R-679. As a result
of the tests, which Dr. Nelson felt showed abnormal findings (R610-609), Mrs. Giles
was referred to the University of California, Irvine for the PET scan. R601.
8.

The PET scan was performed on August 24, 1993 in California.

R149,150. On December 2, 1993 Dr. Nelson issued a report outlining his conclusions as
a result of the findings from the PET scan. The results showed 13 areas of abnormal
metabolism in Mrs. Giles1 brain. Most are in "the anterior portion of the head and
medial temporal regions which are the limbic structures and have to do with executive
function and psychiatric and psychologic functioning in the individual along with
memory, concentration and attention." R-129 to 148. Dr. Nelson concluded that she
has actual organic changes in her brain, shown both electrophysiciologically as well as
metabolically. He found that her medical history is negative for other potential causes
of this damage1, and concluded that this damage was because of the work exposure of
September 7, 1991.R-131.
9.

At the time the Appellant filed her Motion for Reconsideration on June

27, 1994, she included with the motion a June 21, 1994 report by Dr. Gunnar Heuser,
iOther possible causal factors of such damage listed by Dr. Nelson are cerebral concussion, meningitis,
encephalitis, diabetes with hypoglycemia, seizure disorders, smoking, alcoholism and drug use. He
found none of these in her history. The record on appeal does not disclose, as far as counsel can see, any
evidence of any of these factors in the Applicant's medical history.
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M.D., a neurotoxicologist/immunologist in California.

In his report, he concludes,

based upon the prior testing ordered by Dr. Nelson, and on a 5/2/94 SPECT scan, that
Mrs. Giles has objective brain abnormalities, all of which could only be due to toxic
exposure from the chlorine exposure episode. He felt that they could not be due to
disease, metabolic origin or other causes. R157-162.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

This case should have been sent back by the Industrial Commission to

the medical panel in light of the new evidence submitted by the Applicant. The reports
resulting from the testing were not available until after the order denying benefits was
issued by the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission clearly had and has
jurisdiction to send the case back for further consideration of the medical issues and it
was manifest error and abuse of discretion for the Commission to fail to do so.
2.

The Industrial Commission misapplied the law in Stokes in denying

psychiatric counseling and benefits to Mrs. Giles by concluding that she had an
abnormal reaction to normal events when the evidence in the record supports the
conclusion that the events of the day in question constituted an abnormal event The
denial of benefits on this issue should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE REFERRED THE CASE
BACK TO THE MEDICAL PANEL IN LIGHT OF THE NEW EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION FOR REVIEW. TO
FAIL TO DO SO WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ERROR.
The Industrial Commission was presented new and material evidence. It
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has and had authority to send the case back to the medical panel and should have
made the referral.
Section 35-1-78, U.C.A. provides in pertinent part:
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case
shall be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing,
may from time to time modify or change its former findings and
orders.
The Supreme Court of Utah in Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 733
P.2d 158 (Utah 1987) examined this section in connection with the question of
whether new evidence may be submitted and considered by the Industrial
Commission after an order has been issued.
The Spencer case involved an injured truck driver who sought permanent
total disability benefits. After an evidentiary hearing, and after consideration by
a medical panel, the administrative law judge concluded "that the weight of the
evidence vitiates a finding of tentative permanent and total disability..."
However, some permanent partial disability benefits and medical benefits were
awarded.
A few months later, Mr. Spencer applied for a new hearing for payment
of certain medical expenses. He later had a vocational rehabilitation workup
which found him to be unemployable.

His attorney submitted the

rehabilitation report to the Industrial Commission with the request that the
issue of permanent total disability be heard at an upcoming hearing. Instead, the
administrative law judge dismissed the application on the grounds of res judicata.
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He indicated that if the applicant therein had wanted to have that report
considered, he should have requested a continuance, and because there had been
no change in the applicant's condition, the provisions of Section 35-1-78 were
inapplicable.

Mr. Spencer thereafter filed a motion for review, which was

denied, and appeal was then taken to the Supreme Court.
In reversing the Industrial Commission, the Court ruled that the power
given the Industrial Commission by Section 35-1-78 to modify awards is not an
arbitrary power, "but a power wedded to the duty to examine credible evidence.
Under well- established principles of stare decisis, the basis of modification is
provided by evidence of some significant change or new development in the
claimant's injury or proof of the previous award's inadequacy." Spencer, supra.
The Court further held that the report submitted by the applicant after
the initial order denying permanent total disability benefits was not to be
rejected under the doctrine of res judicata. It stated:
"Inherent in the Workmen's Compensation Act is the recognition
that industrial injuries cannot always be diagnosed with absolute
certainty, nor their consequences predicted with complete
certainty, and therefore the rule of res judicata is not ordinarily
applicable in proceedings of this kind."
Spencer, supra.
The record in this case shows that the ALJ entered an order concluding that
Mrs. Giles did not sustain a compensable industrial injury. It was based on the finding
that there was no direct chlorine leak into the atmosphere, and the medical panel's
conclusion that the actual exposure to the superchlorinated water did not cause or
exacerbate any of the Applicant's health problems. The medical panel found nothing

10

objective in the medical records to substantiate any findings of damage involving seizure
disorders, respiratory damage, nor organic brain damage from the event. R-40.
The new evidence submitted along with the Motion for Review and Motion for
Reconsideration is significant when viewed in this light. This evidence is the result of
different objective tests: the neurometric EEG, the P-300 (which is a type of brain scan),
the PET scan, and the SPECT scan. These tests provide the first clinical objective data
of damage from the chlorine episode. They were not available to the medical panel
because the testing had not been done before that time.

They provide hard evidence

that regardless of how Mrs. Giles' exposure is characterized - be it inhalation of chlorine
gas, or fumes from superchlorinated water - she suffered brain damage as a result.
This type of evidence is akin to DNA testing that makes it possible, sometimes
many years after the original event, to determine paternity when other evidence
originally available was inconclusive or negative. Although we are not saying that there
may not be rebuttal evidence that the employer/carrier may be able to submit with
respect to these tests and their results, we respectfully assert that this evidence is
positive objective proof that in the eyes of a medical panel could have a major impact
on their assessment of the cause of some of Mrs. Giles' health complaints.

The

Industrial Commission is not free to slough it off by saying that it should have been
submitted it the time of the evidentiary hearing. See R-166. She was not sent for the
tests until long after the hearing conducted by the ALJ and after the report of the
medical panel.
The Industrial Commission has a duty to examine credible evidence. Because
neither the Commissioners, nor the ALJ are medical doctors, the medical panel is to be
utilized when a significant medical issue is involved. Rule 568-1-9, Utah Administrative
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Code. Although the Industrial Commission has the ultimate responsibility to decide
cases, it may be an abuse of discretion for the Industrial Commission to fail to refer
cases to a medical panel in such cases where the evidence of causal connection between a
work related event and the injury may be uncertain or highly technical. See Champion
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985).
The interpretation of the results of tests ordered by Dr. Richard A. Nelson,
M.D. involve highly technical matters. For example, the readouts of the neurometric
EEG scan and P-300 scan are found on pages 602-608, and again on pages 674-678 of the
record. They are out of order and should be connected with the interpretative reports
found at pages 619 through 622 of the record. Dr. Nelson stated in his 7/14/93 report
that these tests showed "some degree of low-grade organic mental syndrome" (organic
brain damage). R-620. Based on this he recommended the PET scan in California. The
results of this scan are found in the record at 149-150. Dr. Nelson interprets the report
in the record at 129-131 concluding there to be organic changes in the brain resulting in
impairment. The explanations are technical, but he attributes the abnormal test results
to the episode at the Oakridge Country Club. R-131.
The Industrial Commission's only comment about the tests and reports in
question is "The report does not alter the Commissions conclusions." R166.
further explanation or clarification is given.

No

The Order Denying the Motion for

Reconsideration (which motion included additional reports from Dr. Gunnar Heuser,
M.D., neruotoxicologist/immun-ologist) does not even address any of the new evidence
atall.R171,172.
There is no evidence like this, either pro or con, anywhere else in the medical
record.

It is objective.

It is material. It presents a significant contrast to the
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information available for the medical panel to examine when it considered the matter in
February of 1993. At the very least it should have been reviewed by competent medical
doctors appointed by the Commission. It was a clear abuse of discretion and error for
the Industrial Commission to refuse to refer the matter back to the medical panel for
consideration of this new information.

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISAPPLIED THE HOLDING IN
STOKES v. BOARD OF REVIEW WHEN IT DENIED THE APPLICANT
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT AND COMPENSATION DUE TO AN
ABNORMAL REACTION TO ABNORMAL EVENTS
The medical panel did not feel, based on the evidence before it, that Mrs. Giles'
exposure to the superchlorinated water released in the clubhouse basement had any
direct causal relationship with her health complaints. However, it did feel that she had
a psychiatric injury because of her fear that she had been exposed to chlorine gas, and
because of the behavior of emergency personnel at the scene, and because she was given
the impression that something was wrong with her blood gases. The panel concluded
that the events of the episode created a "mental stress arising out of her employment
and was beyond that ordinarily encountered by people in life and employment in
general."

Her past history, which was positive for some psychiatric problems and

somatic complaints, made her vulnerable to the events of the episode on September 7,
1991. As a result, the panel suggested that Mrs. Giles be given psychiatric counseling
for up to six months.
The Administrative Law Judge denied this suggestion, basing his denial on the
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holding in Stokes v. Board of Review. 832 P.2d 56 (Ut. App. 1992). He concluded as
follows:
In the Stokes case the Court denied the injured worker's claim on the
basis that she experienced an abnormal reaction to normal events and
that the abnormality was created by non-work related incidents. In the
instant case, as indicated previously, the applicant has a significant
history of prior psychiatric problems and treatment. But for this nonwork related background, the applicant would not have experienced any
abnormal reaction to the incident at the Oakridge Country Club.
R-114.
The error of the Commission in appliying the holding in the Stokes case to
the facts here is that Stoke stands for the standard that an abnormal reaction to
normal events is not compensable where the abnormality is created by nonwork related events. Here, we have an abnormal reaction to abnormal events.
In Stokes, the claim was made that a post traumatic stress disorder was
sustained as a result of alleged sexual harassment and retaliatory actions through
disciplinary proceedings at work. However, it was found in Stokes that the
sexual harassment never occurred and the disciplinary proceedings were
conducted according to normal company procedure.
Mrs. Giles' situation is very different.

She had a reaction to abnormal

events. The spill of the so-called superchlorinated water from the pump area
where the water and chlorine gas are mixed is not a normal happening at a
country club where the worker in question was a bookkeeper. This was an
unusual event.
Mrs. Giles believed that a rupture of a chlorine line had occurred in the
basement. She went into the basement to find why two co-workers who had
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gone in to fix the problem hadn't returned. She was told by a construction
worker at the club that chlorine could be a serious problem as "you don't mess
with chlorine gas."

She was told to get fans to clear out the basement.

Emergency personnel were called to the scene and the building was evacuated for
a short time.
The Administrative Law Judge implicitly recognized this when he adopted in
its entirety (R114) the report of the medical panel, who wrote:
...the fact that there was an incident in which she was informed
by a fellow employee that there was a chlorine leak in the
basement and the fact that this was reinforced by other
professional people at the scene and subsequently does represent a
mental stress arising out of employment and was beyond that
ordinarily encountered by people in life and employment in
general.
R40.
The medical panel recognized the pre-existing psychiatric history of Mrs.
Giles, but it concluded that she would benefit from up to six months of
counseling because of this event, after which any remaining psychiatric
problems would be due to her pre-existing history.

It recognized that the

abnormal events of the day at least aggravated any underlying problems that
Mrs. Giles may have had.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded on page 12 of his Order that Mrs.
Giles had an abnormal reaction to the "normal event of leaking chlorinated
water." R115. This minimization of the event is not supported by the record.
For the purposes of this appeal, we will concede that there was no true
chlorine gas leak in the basement. That was the conclusion of the ALJ, and it
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appears this conclusion is not so lacking in support as to be clearly erroneous,
nor was it attacked in the Motion for Review. However, it is fully concluded by
the ALJ that there was a release of superchlorinated water, with resulting smell
or fumes, due to a rupture in a line leading from a pump in the clubhouse
basement.
The transcript from the hearing discloses the following evidence:
a.

Michael Whitely of the Oakridge Country Club testified that he

came after the leak was discovered, but he believed a small amount of actual gas
escaped from the pump hose following a power shutoff (R239) and that two
employees went into the basement and smelled it (R239) and reported this back
to Mrs. Giles, who got very excited and even passed out during the course of
the events. R255.
b.

Lynn Groves, maintenance man at the Oakridge Country Club,

testified that he examined the pump area in question two days after the incident
and found a brass line to have popped off at the pump, which would have
released what he termed superchlorinated water, which "smells very strong, sort
of like bleach, like chlorine." R311. "It definitely has a very strong odor to it."
R317.
c.

Marsha Jones of the Oakridge Country Club testified that she was

in the kitchen of the clubhouse and buffet table area on the main level on the
day of the incident and didn't smell any chlorine fumes from where she was at.
R326,327. She testified that firemen went through the building. She verified
that there was a lot of confusion in the building due to the episode. R327.
d.

Thomas Mooso, an investigator for the Industrial Commission,
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Utah Department of Safety and Health, testified that chlorine gas falls rather
than rises unless it is very warm, and such would explain why no one smell
fumes on the main level of the building. R337.
e.

Glenda Giles testified in her own behalf at the hearing. She stated

she was told by a co-worker that there was a chlorine leak in the basement of the
clubhouse. She was soon told by two co-workers that they were going to turn
off the chlorine. R281.

She asked a man working on a remodeling of the

clubhouse for some large fans, which was recommended to her by the pool
manager via a telephone call. The construction worker told her to immediately
call the fire department, that "you don't mess with chlorine gas," and that the
fire department should be asked to bring oxygen breathing masks. She did this.
R281,282.
Mrs. Giles soon realized that the two co-workers had not returned
and so she went into the basement to find them. She went outside to the north
side of the building and at the top of the basement stairs was able to smell
chlorine. She went down the stairs to a door and opened it. The basement
below was dark and dimly lit. She called for the two boys and because of no
answer descended further into the basement.

She testified by then she was

having a hard time breathing, her nose and eyes were running and she was
having a hard time breathing. She felt dizzy and nauseous. She then took a deep
breath and screamed the names of the two boys. When they answered she
learned that they were actually outside. She then left the basement. R282,283.
When the fire department arrived, she was asked to evacuate the ladies'
area inside the building, which she did. She found some locked doors inside and
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learned they had been locked because of the chlorine gas concern. She was told
by a policeman that the gas was drifting north and that she should get out of the
building. She went to the kitchen where she passed out momentarily after sitting
down. She was thereafter taken to the emergency room at a nearby hospital.
R283-285.
From the record, it is seen that the event is wrongly characterized by the
ALJ when he concluded that the episode involved only the normal event of
leaking water. At the time, it was believed there had been a release of chlorine.
The fumes from the superchlorinated water were characterized as having a very
strong smell. This was a very stressful event for Mrs. Giles who was concerned
about the safety of the two co-workers who she thought were in the basement,
and who then made what she felt was a personal risk by going into the basement
to try to find them. She reacted to the smell. Based upon the reports of Dr.
Nelson and the test results, whatever amounts she inhaled when she went into
the basement, it was enough to cause the organic problems set forth in the
reports. But, aside from this, it resulted, as set forth by the medical panel, in
psychiatric injury, which, although not permanent, is in need of treatment.
The conclusions of the ALJ and Industrial Commission denying benefits
for this are against the clear weight of the evidence and are clearly erroneous.
Stokes does not apply to bar benefits for an abnormal reaction to abnormal
events.

On this point the Industrial Commission should be reversed and

benefits as described by the medical panel should be awarded..
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CONCLUSION
This case shoud be remanded back to the Industrial Commission for a referral of
the new medical evidence back to the medical panel.
The Industrial Commission's conclusion that the Applicant is not entitled to
workers' compensation benefits for temporary aggravation of her psychiatric condition
is not supported by substantial evidence and should be overturned and benefits should
be awarded.

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of^anuarV, 1995

Phillip B. Shell
Attorney for Appellant
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Richard Sumsion, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
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Industrial Commission of Utah
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A. FFNDFNGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
B. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
C. ORDER DENYFNG MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

A. FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 92-693

GLENDA W. GILES,

*
Applicant,

*
*

VS.
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 4,
1993, at 1 o/clock p. m., the same being pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Pete N
Vlahos, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Richard G.
Sumsion, Attorney at Law.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge and referred
to a Medical Panel for its evaluation. The Medical Panel Report
was received and distributed to the parties. The applicant filed
an objection to the Report indicating her belief that the Panel had
not been given the records of Dr. Gummow and others. However, a
review of the file and the Panel Report indicates that those
records were forwarded to the Panel. Accordingly, the applicant's
objections are without merit and should be dismissed. The Panel
Report is hereby admitted into evidence.
The applicant also submitted records from her social security
proceeding which have also been reviewed by the Administrative Law
Judge. Being fully advised in the premises, I am prepared to enter
the following,
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant herein, Glenda W. Giles, commenced employment
with the Oakridge Country Club as an office manager on June 3,
1991. At the time of the second interview prior to being hired,
the manager of the country club noticed that the applicant had a
chronic cough and her eyes watered. Shortly after the applicant
was hired, she had a dental problem, which required that she take
time off from work. Thereafter, the applicant had numerous medical
problems as did her son which necessitated her absence from her
employer.
Shortly after the applicant began work at the Oakridge Country
Club, the country club purchased a new computer system.
The
applicant was to be trained by the bookkeeper, Lynne N. Barnes, in
the operation of the computer. Ms. Barnes testified that because
of the applicant's numerous absences from the office, she was
unable to accomplish much training of the applicant. The need for
training arose because Ms. Barnes was pregnant and would be leaving
soon to have her baby.
Ms. Barnes testified that she was
instructed that she was to train Ms. Giles in the necessary
functions to be performed by a general office manager. The office
manager position had opened up because the prior incumbent, Audrey
Sager, had reached the age of 65 and had decided to retire,
however, after Ms. Sager retired, she concluded that she did not
want to stay at home full time, and so, she requested a half-time
position and was given such as the accounts receivable clerk. Ms.
Sager also testified that shortly after the applicant started her
employment, she was sick. Ms. Sager testified that the applicant
had a persistent cough, sinus problems and a tooth problem. In
addition, she also testified that the applicant's son had sustained
an industrial injury to his back and that the -pplicant spent a lot
of time taking her son to the doctor a*.a to various other
locations.
Ms. Sager also testified that the applicant was ill equipped
to handle the job of office manager at the Oakridge Country Club.
Ms. Sager testified that shortly after the applicant had been hired
by the country club, she was called by Ms. Giles one day and asked
to meet her in the bar. When Ms. Sager met with Ms. Giles, Ms.
Giles wanted to know what the general ledger was. It seems that
Ms. Giles, in her prior employment as an office manager with
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McDonnell Douglas, would pay bills for the various departments, but
had no responsibility or experience with preparing departmental
budgets and seeing to it that they were adhered to, which is
required at the club with its general ledger system.
The
applicants performance did not improve. On August 26, 1991, Ms.
Barnes had her baby, and, as such, was unavailable for six weeks
following.
On September 7, 1991, the events which prompted the filing of
a claim in this matter occurred. On the morning of September 7,
1991, there apparently was a flood in the kitchen, which damaged?
some of the tiles on the ceiling. After that crisis was taken care
of, the next events which took place bring us directly to the
matter in controversy in this case. Towards the late morning of
September 7, 1991, the applicant, in her capacity as office
manager, directed an employee, Paul Spencer, to take some things to
the basement of the country club. Mr. Spencer reported back to the
applicant that there was a chlorine leak in the basement. The
applicant attempted to call Mr. Whitely, the manager of the club,
but he was not at home. She then called the pool manager, who
informed her that the leak that was being complained of might be a
back wash of chlorinated water. The pool manager then asked to
speak to Mr. Spencer and, after doing so, Mr. Spencer left. Mr.
Spencer then returned with Jake Thompson, a co-employee. The pool
manager informed Ms. Giles that if she had some big fans, she
should use those to remove the smell from the country club. When
the applicant inquired of the general contractor, who was
performing remodeling duties, if he had any fans, he informed her
that if there was a leak of chlorine gas, she should contact the
fire department. Ms. Giles promptly got off the line with the pool
manager and called the Farmington Fire Department.
Ms. Giles went to the top of the stairs and at that time
smelled chlorine.
She then went down the stairs looking for
Thompson and Spencer, and called to them but received no answer.
The applicant testified that her eyes were burning and her nose was
running, and that she yelled as loud as she could and, at that
time, the young men answered from the parking lot.

GLENDA GILES
ORDER
PAGE FOUR

The fire department arrived and some employees were evacuated.
The part-time interior decorator for the club testified that she
was not evacuated, although she was working in the office at the
time of all of the confusion. She also testified that she noticed
no smell of chlorine upstairs whatsoever.
The applican went on to testify that she was nauseated after
she had walked into the dining room and that she told the firemen
that she did not feel good. Two firemen then laid her down on the
floor and the applicant claims that she was in and out of
consciousness, the medical evidence does not support that claim.
The applicant was taken to Humana Health Davis North for medical
treatment.
The applicant came under the care of Dr. Bart Nilson, who had
the applicant receive a blood gas study as well as conducting a
physical examination. It was also noted that the applicant has
Marfan7s syndrome, a connective tissue disorder. The doctor noted
that the applicant did not have any respiratory difficulty, nor
could he find any skin irritation or irritation to the mucous
membranes of the applicant's nose or mouth. With respect to her
chest, she was given a chest x-ray which was normal.
The
applicant's arterial blood gas study was abnormal, but the doctor
noted that the applicant was not in any respiratory difficulty and
was not wheezing. Those results were then sent to the applicant's
family physician, Dr. Warden.
The applicant reported to Dr. Warden for treatment of this
condition initially on September 9, 1991. Dr. Warden's office
notes for that visit indicate that the applicant's oxygen
saturation was normal and her oxygen content in volume was also
normal. Dr. Warden prescribed Fioricet for the applicant. The
applicant next returned to Dr. Warden on October 21, 1991. At that
time, the applicant was complaining that her left trapezius was
having a terrific spasm with some tenderness. The applicant also
reported:
"Wondering if her lapses in memory could be due to
chlorine and, or, car accident from whiplash." In December of
1991, the applicant was referred to Dr. Sadler for pulmonary
studies. Dr. Warden also at that time noted that the applicant had
a persisting bronchial exudate, which was purulent and yellowish
green.
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In an office note dated December 31, 1991, Dr. Warden makes
the following interesting observation: "Patient continues to have
cough with spasms with a chronic bronchitis probably secondary to
chlorine exposure.11 The interesting thing about the quoted passage
from Dr. Warden's office notes, is that that office note fails to
take
into
account
the
applicant's
pre-exposure
history.
Specifically, on July 12, 1991, for example, Dr. Warden made the
following entry in his office notes:
"Glenda is having a
persisting bronchial cough that has been productive of some green
and yellow stuff." The doctor concluded at that time that the
applicant had chronic bronchitis. Yet six months later, the doctor
attributes that same chronic bronchitis to the applicant's chlorine
exposure, which is obviously incorrect.
Ms. Giles had had problems with bronchitis while working at
Hill Air Force Base. The applicant told Dr. Gummow that: "[a]fter
she left this job, she reported no additional significant problems
with bronchitis." This statement to Dr. Gummow by the applicant
was not true.
It will be recalled that on July 12, 1991, Dr.
Warden's office notes indicate that: "Glenda is having a persisting
bronchial cough that has been productive of some green and yellow
stuff."
The doctor concluded that: "Patient has a chronic
bronchitis." The applicant left her employment at Hill Air Force
Base in October of 1990. The applicant commenced employment with
the Oakridge Country Club on June 3, 1991.
Therefore, the
applicant's testimony that she had no further problems with her
bronchitis after she left McDonnell Douglas at Hill Air Force Base
is just not true.
Therefore, Dr. Gummow's finding that: "Mrs. Giles is also
being followed for a cough which developed after the exposure" is
also not true.
The applicant was seen by Dr. Sadler on January 14, 1992, and,
at that time, Dr. Sadler on page 79 of Exhibit D-l, found:
"Etiology of sx (symptoms) not apparent from monitoring HR (heart
rate), rhythm, BP (blood pressure), lung exam."
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On January 28, 1992, the applicant was seen by Dr. Heiny for
an examination of her sinuses. The applicant had told Dr. Heiny
that "[s]he has never had a previous history of headaches or pain
in the sinuses prior to this." Unfortunately, the history given to
Dr. Heiny by the applicant was not accurate. On cross-examination,
the applicant admitted that she had chronic bronchitis, sinusitis
and headaches before September 7, 1991* In fact, a review of the
medical records of Dr. Hirsbrunner of December 28,-1987, belies
that contention by the applicant.
In that record, there is a
personal history form, which the applicant completed. Under the
ear, nose and throat section of that physical complaint sheet, the
applicant underlined sinus infection, and wrote along side of it:
"Has been in hospital with them."
In that same personal history report, which is contained orf
page 62 of Exhibit D-l, the applicant lists quite a few complaints
that she was having at that time. It is interesting to note that
many of the complaints listed there are the same complaints that
the applicant has now attributed to her industrial exposure of
September 7, 1991.
For example, in 1987, the applicant was
complaining of fainting, dizziness, chills, sweats, fever,
headache, fatigue, nervousness, numbness or pain in the arms, hands
or legs. With respect to the numbness or pain in her arms, the
applicant has indicated that this had its onset: "after falling".
A further review of the past health history completed by the
applicant indicates that in 1970, she fell in the street and
injured her neck. Sometime afterwards, she had a myelogram in the
1970's. In 1983, the applicant fell on some ice injuring her right
shoulder and leg. In 1980, she reported falling from an orchard
ladder approximately eight feet, fracturing her foot and injuring
ler right shoulder and hip* In 1981, she sustained an automobile
accident wherein her neck was injured. In that personal history
report of 1987, the applicant went on to indicate that she was
laving a problem with an earache, nosebleeds, dental decay,
enlarged glands, chronic cough to which she appended the note: "At
the present hard cough had it last winter, DC in Salt Lake City did
iiathermy for it."
The applicant also complained of a rapid
oeating heart under the cardiovascular system and under the heart
iisease section of the form, indicated: "rapid heart rate not
consistent rate".
The applicant also went on to complain of
constipation, diarrhea, pain over the stomach to which she appended
i note: "ulcers", and numerous other complaints.
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On September 22, 1990, the applicant was involved in an
automobile accident.
While she was stopped at a traffic light at
24th and Monroe Street in Ogden, applicant's car was rear ended.
At that time, the applicant complained of:
. . . dizzy, light headed, weak kneed, as if I were going
to pass out; pain at base of skull, base of spine,
between shoulder blades, right arm and shoulder, right
side from shoulder to hip, right knee; couldn't think
clearly. (Emphasis supplied).
The applicant's present complaints, are detailed to Dr. Warden
on page 8 of Exhibit D-2; in that report, the doctor identifies 25r
symptoms that the applicant attributes to her chlorine exposureJ
At the time of the hearing, the applicant had some additional
symptoms that she felt were related to her alleged exposure. Those
symptoms included #26- Dropping things, #27- Heart races at night,
#28- Hand numbness, #29- Diarrhea and pain in the stomach. The
reader may have noticed that the complaints about her heart racing,
hand numbness and diarrhea, are complaints the applicant had
already voiced long prior to the industrial events of September 7,
1991. In that same report, Dr. Warden makes a strange statement.
That statement being: "She was seen at the Kaysville Medical Center
shortly after the exposure and was found to have some difficulty
with respiration. . . ."
That foregoing passage is strange,
because the applicant was not seen at the Kaysville Medical Center
until September 9, 1991.
On September 7, 1991, when the applicant was examined at
Humana Health Davis North by Dr. Nilson, Dr. Nilson specifically
found: "She does not have any respiratory difficulty." The doctor
also observed that the applicant did not have any wheezing.
Therefore, Dr. Warden's entry that two days after her examination
at the hospital, the applicant was having respiratory difficulty,
is a very strange entry indeed. Further, in reviewing the office
note for that first visit to the Kaysville Medical Center on
September 9, 1991, I see no mention in the doctor's office notes of
any respiratory difficulty being suffered by the applicant.
Rather, the doctor only noted that the applicant was still
complaining of a headache, but he specifically noted: "No longer
feels extremely ill." Therefore, the doctor's finding that the
applicant was having respiratory difficulty when he saw her on
September 9, 1991, is not supported either by the medical records
of Humana Health Davis North facility or is that finding supported
by the doctor's own office notes of that visit.
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On further cross-examination, the applicant admitted that in
1979, she was admitted to the hospital complaining of chronic
fatigue and joint pain.
On November 25, 1992, the applicant received an additional
blood gas study which indicated that her pulmonary function was
within normal limits.
The applicant has also had some pre-existing psychiatric
problems. The applicant has a multiple personality disorder and an
organic mental disorder as diagnosed by Dr. Gummow. Dr. Gummow
describes the applicant's psychiatric history as: "Traumatic child
and adult psychiatric history."
The applicant has complained of mental confusion and lack of
mental quickness as the result of her alleged gas exposure at
Oakridge Country Club.
The Administrative Law Judge had the
opportunity to observe the applicant at the evidentiary hearing for
approximately four hours. During that time, the Administrative Law
Judge noted that the applicant, while teary on occasion, did not
exhibit any signs of mental confusion or lack of mental quickness.
Rather, Ms. Giles was well engaged in the prosecution of her
compensation claim, such that she readily supplied dates to her
counsel, and also readily corrected misstatements of facts by
opposing counsel or by others in the courtroom. In addition, the
applicant was able to prepare a fairly detailed schematic of the
physical layout of the Oakridge Country Club while one of her coemployees was being cross-examined by her counsel. Therefore, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that the applicant's claim of mental
confusion resulting from the alleged gas exposure is not credible
nor believable.
The reader may have noticed that the Administrative Law Judge
has referred to the events of September 7, 1991, on occasion as an
alleged exposure of chlorine gas. The reason for that qualification will become much more readily apparent following the upcoming
discussion. As may be remembered, the applicant testified that she
was exposed to chlorine gas.
However, the testimony of the
witnesses shows that, in fact, the applicant was not exposed to any
chlorine gas per se.
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After the fire department had arrived on September 7, 1991,
the department assigned its Hazardous Materials Investigator to
look into the situation in the pool room.
The investigator
testified that he did not smell any chlorine when he arrived at the
country club.
He also testified that he did not observe the
applicant, but did note that she had been transported to the
hospital. Mr. Parker testified that he first noticed a chlorine
smell when he got to the swimming pool pump room. He testified
that he put on his self-contained breathing apparatus to check out
the area.
He also testified that chlorine gas presents a
significant health risk. He went on to testify that chlorine rises
in warm weather and normally would cling to the ground otherwise.
Mr. Parker opined that the brass line carrying gas from the C02 tank
to the pump unit caused chlorine gas to be released. However, in
carefully reviewing the written report prepared by Mr. Parker, the
following passage is noted: "There was a leak at this pump that
permitted pressurized chlorine gas in water to enter the
atmosphere." This last passage is critical, because listening to
Mr. Parker's testimony, one was left with the impression that the
chlorine gas by itself was escaping into the atmosphere of the pump
room. However, this is not what occurred.
Mr. Groves, the maintenance manager, testified that he
reported to work on Monday morning following the chlorine incident,
Saturday, September 7, 1991. Mr. Groves testified that when he
reported to work on Monday morning, September 9, 1991, he was
informed of the problem with the swimming pool, and so he went to
the pump room to investigate the situation. Mr. Groves testified
that there was a leak of superchlorinated water from the brass
line, but no gas had escaped.
He further testified that the
chlorine gas line did not come off as seems to have been intimated
by Mr. Parker.
Tom Mooso, Utah Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH)
investigator, was also called and testified. Mr. Mooso took issue
with Mr. Parker's testimony that chlorine would have risen on
September 7, 1991. Mr. Mooso testified that chlorine falls not
rises,
except
under
extremely
warm
temperatures.
The
Administrative Law Judge being puzzled by this apparent discrepancy
between two individuals who should know these matters, investigated
this particular aspect of the claim further. The Administrative
Law Judge is informed and takes judicial notice of the fact that
chlorine has a specific gravity of 3.24, while oxygen or air has a
specific gravity of 1. What this means in laymen's terms is that
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chlorine is 3.24 times heavier than air. Accordingly, Mr. Parker's
testimony that the chlorine gas, had any leaked, would have been
expected to rise is factually untrue.
As Mr. Mooso testified
chlorine would only rise under extremely warm temperatures. The
witnesses for the applicant and the applicant, herself, testified
that September 7, 1991, was a rainy cool day. Therefore, it was
factually impossible for the chlorine to have risen as alleged by
Mr. Parker.
Further, Mr. Mooso testified concerning the inspection he
conducted at the Oakridge Country Club. Mr. Mooso testified that
upon arriving at the Country Club, he was met by Mr. Whitely, who
informed him what had occurred. According to Mr. Whitely, the
chlorine line from the gas bottle had burped into the atmosphere.
However, Inspector Mooso testified that when he inspected the line,
the "bivalve was still intact, and, as such, that indicated to him
that there had been no leak of gas as thought by both Mr. Parker
and Mr. Whitely. Rather, Mr. Mooso explained that had the line
come off the chlorine bottle, there would have been a continuous
emission of chlorine gas into the pool room. As testified to by
Mr. Groves, when he arrived on Monday, September 9, 1991, for work
that morning, he observed that the line from the chlorine bottle to
the insertion pump was intact. Rather, the line that had come
loose was the line from the pump which contained superchlorinated
water. Mr. Mooso testified that a citation was not written up for
a chlorine gas release because no chlorine gas release occurred.
Having weighed all the testimony and evidence on this
particular subject, I find and conclude that there was no release
of chlorine gas on September 7, 1991. Rather, there was a spill of
superchlorinated water onto the ground. As testified to by both
Mr. Groves and Mr. Mooso, superchlorinated water is not the
equivalent of chlorine gas. Rather, superchlorinated water is
analogous to spilling liquid bleach on one's floor, which is
basically what occurred in this particular situation. Therefore,
I find that the applicant was not exposed to chlorine gas, but
rather smelled superchlorinated water which had spilled on the
floor.
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With the file in this posture, case was referred to the
Medical Panel to determine if the applicant's constellation of 29
complaints were medically related to the industrial incident of
September 7, 1991.
The Panel concluded and found that the
applicant's constellation of complaints were not directly related
to the industrial event of September 7, 1991. Rather, the Panel
found: "The applicant did not receive a toxic dose of chlorine gas
per se, but thought she had inhaled something noxious because of
the smell she perceived."
The Administrative Law Judge has
reviewed the medical and other evidence on this file, and I find
that the foregoing formulation by the Panel is reasonable and I
hereby adopt those findings as my own.
The Panel went on to observe that the applicant's " . . . rich
history of past psychiatric problems and somatic complaints and a
work relationship of great concern to her at the time. . ." made
the applicant " . . . highly vulnerable to any anxiety provoking
event such as what she interpreted as having happened on 7
September 1991." (emphasis added) The Panel also found " . . . that
any longer term residual psychiatric symptoms are a reflection of
past psychiatric trauma and associated problems, rather than having
symptoms indefinitely from her misperception of that single event."
The relevant case law governing this matter is found in the
decision of Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah App.
1992). In the Stokes case the Court denied the injured worker's
claim on the basis that she experienced an abnormal reaction to
normal events and that the abnormality was created by non-work
related incidents. In the instant case, as indicated previously,
the applicant has a significant history of prior psychiatric
problems and treatment. But for this non-work related beckground,
the applicant would not have experienced any abnormal reaction to
the incident at the Oakridge Country Club.
As already found, the applicant was not in fact exposed to
chlorine gas, and she did not sustain any physical injury from the
smell associated with the malfunctioning chlorinator. In fact, the
two individuals who actually entered the pump room to inspect the
chlorinator , were in nuch closer proximity to the leaking
chlorinated water, but suffered no ill effects from their
experience.
Further, the hazardous materials investigator
testified that he could not smell chlorine upstairs where the
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applicant claims she could smell chlorine. Rather, Mr. Parker
stated that the chlorine smell was first noticed upon entering the
pump room itself, which the applicant did not enter. Therefore,
his testimony casts serious doubt on the applicant's testimony that
she could smell chlorine upstairs or partially down the staircase.
Further doubt is also cast by the testimony of the interior
decorator who was upstairs at the time of the incident and did not
smell any chlorine whatsoever.
Based on the foregoing, I find that the applicant may believe
that she was exposed to chlorine gas, but that belief does not
prove that an exposure actually occurred.
Rather, the
preponderance of the evidence indicates that the applicant was not
exposed to chlorine gas on September 7, 1991.
Instead, the
applicant may have smelled some of the leaking chlorinated water,
which she then misperceived as a toxic leak of chlorine gas. The
applicant's severe anxiety attack was an abnormal reaction to the
normal event of leaking chlorinated water, and the applicant's
extreme reaction or abnormality was a product of the applicant's
organic mental disorder and prior psychiatric trauma and associated
problems which were unrelated to her employment. Therefore, the
applicant has failed to establish legal causation and as such her
claim must be dismissed.
The applicant has also failed to
establish medical causation. The medical evidence stands for the
proposition that the applicant's 29 complaints are of a
longstanding nature, and were clearly complained or and treated
prior to the events of September 7, 1991.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
The applicant has failed to establish legal and medical
causation in this matter, and as such her claim of an industrial
accident on September 7, 1991 should be dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Glenda Giles
alleging a compensable accident on September 7, 1991 should be and
the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular erros and
oobjections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
not subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review
is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing with the Commsision, in which to file a written
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
DATED this 15th day of July, 1993.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on July 15, 1993, a copy of the attached
Order in the case of Glenda Giles was mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage prepaid:
Glenda Giles
P.O. 411
Kaysville, UT

84037

Richard Sumsion, Esq.
WCFU
P.O. 57929
SLC, Utah 84157
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B. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
GLENDA W. GILES,

*
Applicant,

vs.

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and
*
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, *
Defendants.

Case No. 92-0693

*

Glenda W. Giles seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's
Order which denied her claim for workers' compensation benefits.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-2-102(2), Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code
R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the
ALJ's decision dated July 15, 1993.
In summary, Mrs. Giles was employed as office manager at
Oakridge Country Club from June 3, 1991. She has a long history of
various ailments which predate her employment at Oakridge. On
September 7, 1992, highly chlorinated water leaked into the
Oakridge office basement.
Mrs. Giles experienced some minimal
exposure to the chlorinated water.
After the foregoing incident, Mrs. Giles suffered a severe
anxiety attack. She believed that her preexisting ailments had
become more severe after the incident. There is no substantial
evidence in the record to support Mrs. Giles' belief. However, the
record does establish that her reaction to the incident was
abnormal and unrelated to her employment at Oakridge.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISCUSSION
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act compensates workers for
injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45. However, an abnormal reaction to normal
events is not compensable where the abnormality is created by nonwork related incidents. Stokes v. Board of Review. 832 P.2d 56, 61
(Utah App. 1992) .
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In this case, Mrs. Giles experienced an extreme emotional
reaction to her discovery that super chlorinated water was leaking
in the country club basement. While an event such as occurred at
Oakridge is not a frequent occurrence, it also was not a
particularly serious or alarming incident. As noted by the ALJ,
the reasons for Mrs. Giles' reaction were not related to her
employment. Furthermore, the medical evidence does not establish
that her ailments are related to the incident. Consequently, Mrs.
Giles has failed to establish her right to workers' compensation
benefits.
The Commission is aware of the report of Dr. Nelson, submitted
for the first time after the ALJ had issued his decision. In the
interest of efficiency and fairness, the doctor's report -should
have been submitted at the hearing conducted by the ALJ. However,
the report does not alter the Commission's conclusions.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds, as did the
ALJ, that Mrs. Giles has failed to establish that she is entitled
to benefits under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act.
ORDER
The Commission affirms the Administrative Law Judge's Order,
dated July 15, 1993, and denies Mrs. Giles' Motion For Review. It
is so ordered.
DATED this C? &* day of June, 1994.

IMPORTANT!

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT^ PAGE
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NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party .may
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this
Order.
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
GLENDA W. GILES,

*
*

Applicant,

*
*

vs.

*

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

*

OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and
*
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, *

Case No. 92-0693

*

Defendants.

*

Glenda W. Giles asks the Industrial Commission of Utah to
reconsider its previous Order denying Ms- Giles' claim for workers'
compensation benefits.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §63-46b-13 and
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.0.
DISCUSSION
In response to Ms. Giles' Motion For Reconsideration, the
Commission has once again carefully reviewed the record in this
matter. Based on its review, the Commission again concludes that
the ALJ properly denied Ms. Giles' claim for workers' compensation
benefits. As noted in the ALJ's decision:
. . . (Ms. Giles) may believe that she was exposed to
chlorine gas, but that belief does not prove that an
exposure actually occurred. Rather, the preponderance of
the evidence indicates that the applicant was not exposed
to chlorine gas on September 7, 1991. . . . (T)he
applicant's extreme reaction or abnormality was a product
of the applicant's organic mental disorder and prior
psychiatric trauma and associated problems which were
unrelated to her employment.
The foregoing conclusions of the ALJ are fully supported by
persuasive medical opinion, as well as other evidence in the
record.
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ORDER
In light of t-he foregoing, the Commission reaffirms its prior
decision in thi? matter and denies Ms. Giles' Motion For
Reconsideration. It is so ordered.
T>KT£T> this

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
A4+1

<5ollee'n S. Coiton
Commissioner

=*£20.

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may" appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a Petition For Review with that Court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Alan Henn^bold, certify that I did mail by prepaid first
class postage a copy of the ORDER DENYING MOTION" FOR
RECONSIDERATION in the case of GLENDA GILES, Case Number 93-0693,
onJdCA. day of July/ 1994 to the following:
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WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
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